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Which Italian family farms will have a successor? 
Introduction 
A characteristic of agriculture in western countries is that farms are mostly operated as a 
family business
1. This implies that business continuity is normally ensured by an intergenerational 
transmission within the household. If there is no person within the household willing to take over 
the farm, this might entail effects to be evaluated from a general welfare point of view. The land of 
farms without successors being used for enlarging neighbouring farms has generally positive 
effects, since it might generate economies of scale and hence a greater efficiency. The farm being 
abandoned, on the other side, might entail environmental problems and land degradation, specially 
in marginal areas. But also the transfer to a new operator might have negative effects, if farm 
operation implies the accumulation of specific knowledge, that is lost if it is not transmitted to a 
child who worked with the parents. Finally, when farms have no successor, operators usually go on 
working on the farm even when old, and they are generally less open to innovations and to technical 
progress, so that there is a lower efficiency than it would be possible with a faster generational 
turnover. 
The problem of farm succession is serious when considering the ageing of agricultural 
working population. In the Italian Region we consider, Piedmont, the average age of farm operators 
is 58 years, 35 percent of them are older than 65 years, and only 14 percent are 40 years or younger. 
In a short period of time, many operators will be too old to operate a farm, and the destiny of their 
farms is at stake, if no successor will take on their farms. This is therefore an obvious issue of 
policy concern. 
The literature of the family as an insurance against risk and more generally about 
intergenerational transmission (Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981; Laferrère, 1999) is the appropriate 
                                                 
1 High supervision costs of hired labour, due to the technical features of agricultural production, have been pointed at to 
explain this situation: by contrast, family labour does not need supervision, since family members are involved in the 
income it provides (Pollack, 1985).   3
reference about the transfer of the farm assets. But it does not account for the specificity of farm 
transfers within families, i.e., why the farm operation, and not only the value of farm assets, is 
transmitted within families. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985) show that the accumulation of farm-
specific, experience-based knowledge can explain why transfer within the family is dominant. Their 
argument is that the accumulation of farm-specific knowledge raises labour productivity, so that for 
an offspring who worked on the farm and gained specific knowledge the farm is more profitable 
and the land is worth more than for anybody else. Therefore, the children have an incentive to work 
on the farm when young at a lower wage than external labourers and to purchase the farm from their 
parents. Rosenzweig and Wolpin’s paper focused on developing countries; as they note, the effects 
of technological innovations, that reduce the value of accumulated knowledge, should be studied. It 
is therefore of interest to verify if their argument is still valid in a developed country environment. 
At first sight, it would be tempting to answer in the negative. Technology is rapidly changing, and 
farm operation is largely and increasingly based on scientific knowledge rather than on experience. 
Nevertheless, farming skills are still very location and crop-specific, due to the heterogeneity of 
soils and weather conditions, that require that scientific knowledge be adapted to those specific 
conditions. Second, the degree of standardization of techniques varies according to the type of 
production and to the specialization of farms, and certain types of farming require higher technical 
skills than others. Third, market trends in the last decades push towards an increasing quality 
diversification of food. Diversification of agricultural products requires location-specific technical 
skills, to exploit diversified local conditions, and location-specific marketing skills to implement 
actions for the valorisation of the terroir. In summary, how much specific knowledge is a 
determinant of farm succession is a question to be addressed empirically. 
Apart from some work of social scientists (Khera, 1973; Errington 1993; Blanc and Perrier 
Cornet, 1993), only few economic papers deal with this problem and the related problem of exits 
from farming for developed countries (Pesquin et al., 1999; Weiss, 1999; Stiglbauer and Weiss, 
2000; Kimhi and Nachlieli, 2001; Glauben et al., 2002 and 2004; Hennessy, 2002). The definition   4
of successor is different in these papers, and  the determinants generally include operator’s and 
household characteristics, and indicators farm profitability and of  labour intensity. In the above 
literature the specific experience is not specifically taken into consideration. 
The goal of this paper is therefore to further explore the determinants of intra-family 
succession in Italian farms with particular emphasis on the effect of specific knowledge and on the 
effects of part- or full-time status of the operator.  
Theoretical background and empirical approach 
From a theoretical point of view, farm succession is a complex issue, since it involves 
decision-making both by the parents and by the children. Moreover, a decision about succession 
often not only involves choices concerning work, but also residence. Planning a succession also 
implies investments in human capital by parents and children (Kimhi, 1995) and the choice of the 
appropriate timing (Pesquin et al., 1999; Kimhi, 1994 and 1997). Finally, parents’ and children’s 
work choices are probably interrelated in a complex way, and  some papers explicitly modelled 
these interrelationships as a Nash game (Pesquin et al., 1999). From an empirical point of view, it 
would be desirable to observe actual successions. But since they happen at a generation time 
distance, data concerning actual successions along time are seldom available (one exception is in 
Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000). Hence, some papers are based on operators’ statements of having a 
successor in the household (Kimhi and Lopez, 1999; Glauben et al., 2002 and 2004; Hennessy, 
2002) or on legal decisions connected with the succession (Kimhi and Nachlieli, 2001). We use a 
different approach, and we consider that there is a likely successor in the farm household if a 
household member of the new generation  is involved in the farm operation, which is shown by 
his/her choice to work on the farm. 
We assume that a decision is made by the potential successor among different work 
alternatives, so to maximise his/her expected utility. Though the choice of a family member to work 
on the farm will not necessarily result in the farm handed over to him/her, it undoubtedly raises this   5
possibility, due to accumulation of idiosyncratic human capital, which renders less likely for a 
young member to give up farm operation in the future. Working on the farm also creates trust and 
collaboration between the present operators and the prospective successor, possibly reinforced by 
income pooling, and renders more likely an implicit contract among them by which the farm 
succession obtained by the child is traded off with the commitment to support the parents in old age. 
It also copes with moral hazard and adverse selection problems in evaluating the farm worth, and 
reduces transaction costs in farm transmission (Bjuggren and Sund, 2002). The preference for 
working on the farm and in prospect for succeeding to the parent is based on the comparison 
between the expected utility from working on the family farm and taking it over with the expected 
utility from working off the farm. The comparison concerns expected income from both 
alternatives, considerations about risk attached to each alternatives, and idiosyncratic preferences 
(cultural heritage, preference towards outdoor work and towards independent work, parent-child 
relationship, etc.). 
Of course, for the young household member to take on the family farm, also the operator’s 
agreement is required.  In the parent’s perspective, the choice is based on the comparison between 
the expected utility from keeping the child working on the farm or not, which depends on insurance 
considerations, on preferences about the continuity of a farm tradition, on altruism towards the 
child.  
Having a young member working on the farm is therefore the result of both operator’s and 
child’s choices. In our data we do not observe actual successions, but we consider that if a younger 
household member works on the farm, and  the actual succession can therefore take place in the 
future, the operator agreed that he/she did so. The situation is therefore the final result of  a choice 
involving both parent and child. We do not explicitly address the way in which the interactions 
between parent and child led to the decision-making process, and we simply assume that a 
collective choice has been made. An overall utility is attached to having a successor or not, and the   6
alternative yielding the greater utility has been chosen. Call Vij the indirect utility that household i 
attains when choosing alternative j (working on the farm). The alternative is not working on the 
farm, which yields utility Vik.  
The utilities Vij and  Vik that the household obtains from each alternative concerning the 
succession are assumed to have a deterministic component in a set of explanatory variables Xi and 
Zi,  possibly with common terms, and of random terms εij and εik, respectively. The indirect utility 
stemming from the individual’s choice is not observable, but the choice is. Then, alternative j is 
chosen if: 
  Vij > Vik         ( 1 )  
b’j Xi + εij > b’k Zi + εik         ( 2 )  
b’j Xi - b’k Zi > εik - εij           ( 3 )  
or: 
c’Mi > µi         ( 4 )  
Assuming the error µ = εik - εij is normally distributed results in a probit model (Maddala 
1983; Greene, 1993).  
Data 
The basic farm household data are drawn from individual farm records of Piedmont Region 
(Italy) of the Agricultural Census held in 2000. A random sample of 10,000 farms (8.2 percent of 
the total) was drawn from the farm records. Since the interest was in family farms, those farms that 
were not individual farms or “società semplice” were excluded, as well as farms reporting sales for 
less than 4 million Lire (€ 2066), to avoid considering hobby or very marginal farms.    7
We consider as prospective successors the children working on the farm
2. Nevertheless, they 
may work on the farm as their exclusive, predominant or secondary activity. We decided to test two 
specifications. The first one  assumes the presence of a potential successor (represented by the 
dummy variable Succ1) only when at least one child is working exclusively or predominantly on 
the farm. The second model assumes that a potential successor is any child working on the farm, 
regardless of the quantity of labour contributed (dummy variable Succ2). In a way, the former 
variable might represent the possibility of an intergenerational transfer of more professional farms, 
while the latter includes also marginal or small, part-time farms. Family farms in the former 
situation are 9.3 percent and in the latter are 16.7 percent, which can give an idea of the relevance of 
the problem of family succession.  
A first group of explanatory variables refers to farm characteristics that may favour the 
accumulation of specific experience. Dummy variables for specialised types of farming, based on 
the FADN classification of farms
3, were included for dairy, cattle raising and fattening, fruits, 
quality viticulture. Other dummy variables concern organic production, and the farm having agro-
tourism activities, other activities (recreational activities, handicrafts, etc.), or making wine on the 
farm. All these variables are predicted to increase the value of specific knowledge and, hence, the 
probability of an intra-family succession. To control for the differences among farms when keeping 
types of farming equal, we used Standard Gross Margins as calculated for FADN
4. A second group 
of variables refers to the operator’s characteristics: operator’s gender, operator’s age and age 
squared, education levels, represented by dummy variables (the reference group is those operators 
                                                 
2 Unfortunately, the data do not indicate the kinship of individuals with the operator but for the spouse. Therefore, to 
identify the children, we had to assume that they are those relatives at least 18 years younger than the operator.  
3 The Farm Accounting Data Network of the European Union defines a farm as specialised in a Type of Farming (TF) if 
the Standard Gross Margin (SGM) for the particular production covers more than 2/3 of total SGM. Standard Gross 
Margins are calculated as the balance between a standard value of production and a standard value of certain specific 
costs, determined for the various crop and livestock characteristics within each region. 
4 Using SGM rather than total sales may also avoid an endogeneity problem, that might raise if succession prospects 
influence operator’s labour effort and, by this way, production and sales. SGM only depends on the area covered by the 
different crops and on the number of animals. The type of farming is less likely influenced by succession prospects, 
since it depends to a large extent on natural conditions. Farm physical size might in principle more easily be influenced 
by succession prospects, which would make SGM endogenous; this problem cannot be addressed with our data but, 
given the rigidity of the land market in Italy, it should not be too serious.    8
with compulsory level or less), and a dummy variable indicating whether he/she followed 
professional training. A third group comprises variables that represent both farm characteristics and 
human capital of the operator: a dummy variable indicating whether farm accounts are kept, another 
indicating whether computer and Internet are used, and a third indicating whether the farm belongs 
to some economic association. Finally, some variables represent characteristics of the area 
(dummies for mountain and hill areas) and local labour market conditions. The latter, given the 
long-term nature of succession decision,  are drawn from the 1991 Population Census and refer to 
Sistemi Locali del Lavoro (SSL). SSLs are aggregations of municipalities (Comuni) established by 
ISTAT (the National Statistics Bureau) based on commuting patterns to work. Variables were 
attributed to each observation according to the SSL in which the farm was located. They comprise 
the employment rate, intended to represent the overall job availability, the share of unskilled jobs 
(proxied by industry, buildings, commerce), the share of agricultural to total employment. The 
1991-2001 variations in these variables were also introduced.  
Since there is no possibility of observing a child working on the farm if he/she is too young to 
work, the sample should comprise only those households in which having a child in working age is 
a real possibility. Inspection of the data showed that the minimum age at which some household is 
in this situation is when the operator is 34 years old. Farm households with younger operators were 
therefore excluded from the sample, and the final sample size was 8134 (6.7 percent of total farms).  
Table 1 presents the definition and the descriptive statistics of the variables. 
Results 
Table 2 presents the results of the probit models. The table also includes the marginal effects, 
that indicate the change in the probability of the dependent variable due to a marginal change in the 
explanatory variables
5. A likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis of no effect of the explanatory 
                                                 
5 Marginal effects depend on the value of the explanatory variables at which they are calculated. Since many 
explanatory variables are dummies, marginal effects were calculated at the mean values of the continuous variables and 
at zero values of the dummy variables. While the interpretation of the marginal effects of the continuous variables is as   9
variables at any conventional significance level for both models. Also, the models overall correctly 
predict 91 and 95 percent of the actual outcomes for model 1 and 2, respectively, though they do a 
very good job in predicting the alternative of no successor (99.7 and 99.1 percent of correct 
predictions, respectively), but are rather deceiving for the other alternatives (5 and 7 percent), 
probably due to the very unbalanced proportions of the alternatives in the sample (Greene 1993, p. 
652). This is also common in other studies on this issue (e.g., Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000).  
An obvious determinant of succession is farm economic size: the SGM variable is significant 
for both models. Also Stiglbauer and Weiss (2000) find a positive effect of farm size on succession, 
unlike Kimhi and Nachlieli (2001), who explain their results by previous investment behaviour in 
the particular Israeli situation. In general, a larger farm income makes working on the farm more 
attractive for children relative to off-farm work. Nevertheless, the marginal effect of SGM on the 
probabilities of the different outcomes is not very strong: a 1000 Euro increase in SGM raises the 
probability of Succ1 and Succ2 by 0.1 and 0.2 percent at the mean values.  
Among operator’s characteristics, gender is significant, and a female operator increases the 
likelihood of a succession by 3 percent in the case of the first model. The effect is stronger in the 
second model (9 percent). This result is consistent with Stiglbauer and Weiss’ (2000) finding that a 
female operator raises the likelihood of family succession.  
Operator’s age significantly affects the probability of having a successor. Its effects is 
curvilinear, since the parameters of age squared are significant. Though, the ages of maximum 
probability of succession are well beyond retirement age, which means that for all practical purpose 
the probability is strictly increasing with operator’s age. These results are consistent with Kimhi and 
Nachlieli’s (2001), that also find a positive effect of operator’s age on designing a successor, with a 
maximum from 67 to 82 years, depending on the models, and with Stiglbauer and Weiss’ (2000).  
                                                                                                                                                                  
usual, the interpretation of the marginal effects of the dummy variables is the change in probability due to a shift from 
not being to being in the status indicated by the dummy variable (which in general is also the median value, except for 
gender, accounts and hill variables).   10
The effects of operator’s education are negative, though not significant for some school 
degrees. Surprisingly, they are also negative for the agricultural high school. In general, higher 
levels of education of the operator entail a greater farm profitability, that renders farming more 
attractive for prospective successors. On the other side, a greater education may also raise the 
potential off-farm wage. Since usually children of highly educated operators are highly educated 
too, this may raise their off-farm wage and render them less eager to take on the farm. This double 
effect of education has already been noted with reference to off-farm employment of farmers, and 
the second has generally been found to prevail (Huffman, 2001). The predominance of the off-farm 
wage effect of education seems to apply to succession in Piedmont, contrary to what was found for 
Upper Austria (Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000) and in Israel (Kimhi and Nachlieli, 2001). We also find 
that formal education in agriculture is no different from the corresponding general education. By 
contrast, having followed agricultural training significantly increases the likelihood of succession. 
Also another variable connected with the accumulation of human capital by the operator, i.e.,  
keeping farm accounts, has a significant positive impact. By contrast, though their signs are 
positive, neither the computer and Internet variable nor the association variables are significant for 
the first model, but the latter is for the second one. Probably belonging to an association helps in 
working on the farm even on a part-time basis.  
The parameters of the dummy variables for mountain and hill areas are positive and 
significant (except for hills in the first model). This may either be the effect of traditions and of 
farming cultural heritage, or of stricter land market conditions that renders it more difficult for 
parents to sell the land. Also particular conditions not captured by the relevant labour market 
variables that make it difficult to find alternative jobs for the successors may be a reason for these 
results.  
An important group of explanatory variables are those representing the accumulation of 
specific knowledge, as measured by farm specialisation in types of farming requiring high skills.   11
The parameters of farm specialisation in fruits, quality vineyards, dairy and cattle raising and 
fattening are all positive and significant for the second model; the results, though still positive, are 
more mixed in the first one. The largest increase in probability of succession is when the farm is 
specialised in cattle, but also dairy, fruits and quality vineyards have sizeable effects.   
Operator’s off-farm work status has interesting effects. The likelihood of a succession is lower 
when the operator works off the farm but keeps farming as his/her main occupation, relative to 
being a full-time farmer, though this result is only weakly significant. When the operator has an off-
farm job as his/her main activity, the probability of succession is significantly higher than when 
he/she is full-time. There is therefore no consistent pattern relating the operator’s degree of part-
time farming and the probability of succession. Stiglbauer and Weiss (2000) found that if the 
operator was not a full time farmer the likelihood of a family succession was significantly lower. By 
contrast, a result similar to ours, though not statistically significant, was found by Kimhi and 
Nachlieli (2001). Our results differentiating operator’s off-farm work status between main and 
secondary occupation suggest that the interrelationships between off-farm work choices of the 
operator and the potential succession are complicated. A parent with a successor might mainly work 
off the farm exactly because he has someone substituting for him on the farm and wants to leave 
him more responsibility in running the farm; while an operator with no successor might work 
mainly off the farm as a prelude to exiting from farming. In the same way, the finding that 
secondary off-farm work is inversely related to succession probabilities might hide different 
phenomena. This problem cannot be addressed with our data, and more research is needed on this 
issue. 
Explanatory variables concerning local labour market conditions have the predicted signs and 
are significant. An high employment rate, indicating many job opportunities for farm children, 
significantly decreases the likelihood of succession.. By contrast, the share of agricultural   12
employment significantly increases these probabilities (by 4.3 and 3.9 percent for a 10 percent 
increase in the share. The 1991-2001 changes in the labour market variables were never significant. 
Conclusions  
In this paper probit models of the determinants of intra-family succession for a sample of 
Piedmont farms were estimated. In addition to other determinants already considered in previous 
studies, we were interested in testing in a technologically advanced country the hypothesis, put 
forward by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985) for LDCs, that the accumulation of specific knowledge 
creates an incentive for intra-family succession.  
In our model, the variables representing specific knowledge do significantly affect the 
probability of a succession. Therefore the results suggest that also in developed economies the 
accumulation of specific knowledge plays a role in creating incentives to intra-family transmission 
of farm operation. Nevertheless, their impact, as well as the impact of other explanatory variables, 
is not very strong. This suggests that the influence of specific knowledge in determining farm 
succession in developed countries is less marked than in developing countries, due to technological 
progress and to standardized and formal knowledge, and that other variables, not considered in the 
studies up to now, might affect the succession in family farms. One obvious determinant might be 
children’s individual tastes for farming, which might induce them to accept taking over the farm 
even when it provides a lower income than alternative jobs (Fall and Magnac, 2004). Identifying 
this determinant is obviously impossible with a cross-section sample, but it might be difficult even 
with panel data, given the long-term nature of the succession process.  
Another direction of further research is the relationship between parents’ off-farm work 
choices and succession. In the previous literature the results in this respect are mixed, and our 
results suggest that complex relationships are involved between the operator’s off-farm work choice 
and succession. There seems to be no monotonic pattern between the degree of part-time farming 
and the probability of succession. This suggests that choices of off-farm work might be made   13
differently according to the prospects of farm succession the specific operator is facing. If this is the 
case, then off-farm work choices and succession are a joint decision, to be modelled accordingly; 
this issue deserves further research. 
Finally, as a general picture, it is comforting that a core of strong, specialised farms has good 
perspectives of going on with the new generation. On the other hand, for the large majority of farms 
there are gloomy continuity prospects. It is easily predictable that in a short term agriculture will 
undergo deep changes in property structures and in farm operations. This change should be 
governed, on one side to facilitate the consolidation and enlargement of remaining farms, and on the 
other side to avoid the territory degradation induced by a too rapid depopulation. 
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Table 1- Definition and descriptive statistics of the variables (N = 8134) 
    
Symbol Definition  Mean  Std.Dev. 
Explanatory variables      
GSM  Gross Standard Margin (thousand €)  13.358 26.373 
Fruits   =1 if specialised in Fruits   0.099 0.299 
Quality viticulture   =1 if specialised in Quality viticulture   0.111 0.314 
Cattle   =1 if specialised in Cattle raising and fattening  0.027 0.162 
Dairy   =1 if specialised in Dairy  0.038 0.191 
Agro-tourism   =1 if with an agro-tourism activity  0.006 0.075 
Wine-making   =1 if making wine  0.085 0.279 
Organic   =1 if organic farming  0.020 0.141 
Other activities   =1 if other activities (recreational, handicrafts, 
etc.)   0.181 0.385 
Accounts   =1 if farm accounts are kept  0.516 0.500 
Computer   =1 if computer or Internet is used  0.014 0.118 
Association   =1 if the farm belongs to economic associations 
(co-operatives, consortia, etc. )  0.246 0.431 
Mountain   =1 if in mountain area  0.149 0.356 
Hill   =1 if in hilly area  0.562 0.496 
Gender   =1 the operator is male  0.711 0.453 
Age Operator's  age  59.505 12.961 
Graduate agriculture   =1 if the operator graduated in agriculture   0.003 0.059 
Graduate other   =1 if the operator graduated in other fields  0.014 0.119 
High school agriculture  =1 if the operator has an high school diploma in 
agriculture  0.020 0.140 
High school other   =1 if the operator has an high school diploma in 
other fields  0.118  0.323 
Professional training   =1 if the operator followed professional training 
courses  0.077 0.266 
Minor PT   = 1 if the operator works off the farm as the 
minor occupation  0.016 0.125 
Main PT   = 1 if the operator works off the farm as the 
main occupation  0.136 0.343 
Employment rate  Employment rate 1991  0.588  0.025 
Change employment   1991/2001 change in employment rate    1.067  0.016 
Share Agriculture   Share of agricultural to total employment  0.114  0.051 
Change agricultural   1991/2001 change in agricultural share  0.706  0.154 
Share unskilled   Share of unskilled (industry, buildings, 
commerce) to total employment  0.677 0.053 
Change unskilled   1991/2001 change in share of unskilled  0.909  0.030 
Dependent variables:      
Succ1  Child working full-time or mainly on the farm  0.093 0.290 
Succ2  Child working on the farm (in any proportion)  0.167 0.373 
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Table 2 - Results of the probit models        
  Succ1   Succ2 
  Coeff.  t-ratio  Marg. Eff. Coeff.  t-ratio  Marg. Eff.
Constant  -1.258  -0.507 - -0.191  -0.09 - 
GSM 0.009*** 12.584  0.001  0.009*** 11.869  0.002 
Fruits 0.122  1.597  0.011  0.167*** 2.632  0.030 
Quality viticulture  0.129*  1.877  0.012  0.174*** 2.929  0.031 
Cattle 0.435*** 3.946  0.039  0.382*** 3.675  0.069 
Dairy 0.227**  2.278  0.020  0.332*** 3.68  0.060 
Agro-tourism 0.389  1.614  0.035  0.242 1.042 0.044 
Wine-making -0.196** -2.03  -0.018  -0.069 -0.811 -0.012 
Organic -0.227  -1.417  -0.020  -0.134 -1.007 -0.024 
Other activities  0.284*** 4.047  0.025  0.208*** 3.239  0.038 
Accounts 0.533*** 9.989  0.048  0.430*** 9.811  0.038 
Computer 0.114  0.72  0.010  0.157 1.056 0.028 
Association 0.081  1.628  0.007  0.107** 2.455  0.019 
Mountain 0.267*** 3.539  0.024  0.359*** 5.669  0.065 
Hill 0.070  1.269  0.006  0.203*** 4.24  0.037 
Gender -0.317*** -6.611  -0.028  -0.507*** -12.707  -0.091 
Age 0.058*** 4.117  0.005  0.069*** 5.547  0.012 
Age squared  -0.000** -2.402  -0.000  -0.000*** -2.795  -0.000 
Graduate agriculture  -0.459  -1.096  -0.041  -0.045 -0.146 -0.008 
Graduate other  -0.152  -0.731  -0.014  -0.466** -2.397  -0.084 
High school agriculture  -0.299*  -1.689  -0.027  -0.352** -2.148  -0.064 
High school other  -0.082  -1.112  -0.007  -0.129** -2.063  -0.023 
Professional training  0.142*  1.898  0.013  0.112 1.633 0.020 
Minor PT  -0.391*  -1.699  -0.035  -0.188 -1.042 -0.034 
Main PT  0.236*** 2.921  0.021  0.298*** 4.433  0.054 
Employment rate  -3.921*** -3.123  -0.351  -2.278** -2.147  -0.411 
Employment change  -2.223 -1.082 -0.199  -2.321 -1.342 -0.419 
Agricultural share  4.751*** 4.193  0.425  2.144** 2.194  0.387 
Agricultural change  0.035 0.182 0.003  -0.121 -0.664 -0.022 
Unskilled share  2.566*** 3.052  0.230  1.125 1.592 0.203 
Unskilled change  -0.725 -0.558 -0.065  -1.48 -1.402  -0.267 
N.  Obs  8134     8134    
Log Likelihood  -2182.2      -3225.36    
Likelihood Ratio test of no 
effect of the variables: χ
2 (d.f.) 
658.01 
(30)    
892.95 
(30)    
Likelihood Ratio Index  0.131      0.1216     
Correct predictions (%)  90.89      0.954     
***, **, *: significant at 1, 5, 10 percent, respectively   
 